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Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus 2
Transmission Potential,
Iran, 2020
Kamalich Muniz-Rodriguez,1 Isaac Chun-Hai Fung,1
Shayesteh R. Ferdosi, Sylvia K. Ofori, Yiseul Lee,
Amna Tariq, Gerardo Chowell
Author affiliations: Georgia Southern University, Statesboro,
Georgia, USA (K. Muniz-Rodriguez, I.C.-H. Fung, S.K. Ofori);
The Translational Genomics Research Institute, Phoenix,
Arizona, USA (S.R. Ferdosi); Georgia State University
School of Public Health, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (Y. Lee, A. Tariq,
G. Chowell)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2608.200536

To determine the transmission potential of severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in Iran in 2020, we
estimated the reproduction number as 4.4 (95% CI 3.9–
4.9) by using a generalized growth model and 3.5 (95%
CI 1.3–8.1) by using epidemic doubling time. The reproduction number decreased to 1.55 after social distancing
interventions were implemented.

S

ince early 2020, Iran has been experiencing a devastating epidemic of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) (1). To determine the transmission potential
of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
2 and thereby guide outbreak response efforts, we
calculated basic reproduction numbers (R0). During the early transmission phase, R0 quantifies the
average number of secondary cases generated by a
primary case in a completely susceptible population,
absent interventions or behavioral changes. R0>1
indicates the possibility of sustained transmission;
R0<1 implies that transmission chains cannot sustain
epidemic growth. As the epidemic continues, the effective reproduction number (Re) offers a time-dependent record of the average number of secondary
cases per case as the number of susceptible persons
becomes depleted and control interventions take effect. We used 2 methods to quantify the reproduction number by using the curve of reported COVID-19 cases in Iran and its 5 regions (Appendix Table
1, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/26/8/200536-App1.pdf). The Georgia Southern University
Institutional Review Board made a non–human subjects determination for this project (H20364), under
the G8 exemption category.
1
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For method 1, we used a generalized growth
model (2) with the growth rate and its scaling factor
to characterize the daily reported incidence. Next,
we simulated the calibrated generalized growth
model by using a discretized probability distribution of the serial interval and assuming a Poisson error structure (Appendix).
We based method 2 on calculation of the epidemic’s doubling times, which correspond to the
times when the cumulative incidence doubles and are
estimated by using the curve of cumulative daily reported cases. To quantify parameter uncertainty, we
used parametric bootstrapping with a Poisson error
structure around the number of new reported cases to
derive 95% CIs (3–5). Assuming exponential growth,
the epidemic growth rate is equal to ln(2)/doubling
time. Assuming that the preinfectious and infectious
periods follow an exponential distribution, R0 ≈ (1 +
growth rate × serial interval) (Appendix) (6).
For both methods, the serial interval was assumed to follow a gamma distribution; mean (±
SD) = 4.41 (± 3.17) days (7; C. You et al., unpub.
data, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101
/2020.02.08.20021253v2). We used MATLAB version R2019b (https://www.mathworks.com) and R
version 3.6.2 (https://www.r-project.org) for data
analyses and creating figures. We determined that
a priori α = 0.05.
Using Wikipedia as a starting point, we doublechecked the daily reported new cases during February 19–March 19, 2020 (the day before the Iranian
New Year) against official Iran press releases and
other credible news sources and corrected the data
according to official data (Appendix Tables 2, 3, Figure 1). Incident cases for the 5 regions were missing for 2 days (March 2–3), which we excluded from
our analysis. Because the reported national number
of new cases did not match the sum of new cases
reported in Iran’s 5 regions on March 5, we treated
each time series as independent and used the data
as reported. Using method 1, we estimated R0 data
for February 19–March 1, 2020. Using method 2, we
estimated R0 from the early transmission phase (February 19–March 1, 2020) and Re based on the growth
rate estimated during March 6–19, 2020, when the
epidemic slowed, probably reflecting the effect of
social distancing.
Using method 1, we estimated an R0 of 4.4 (95%
CI 3.9–4.9) for COVID-19 in Iran. We estimated a
growth rate of 0.65 (95% CI 0.56–0.75) and a scaling
parameter of 0.96 (95% CI 0.93–1.00) (Appendix Table
4). The scaling parameter indicated near-exponential
epidemic growth (Figure). Using method 2, we found
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Figure. Estimates of transmission potential for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in Iran, 2020. A) Growth rate, r; B)
scaling of the growth rate parameter, p; C) mean basic reproduction number, R0; and D) fit of the generalized growth model (method 1)
to the Iran data, assuming Poisson error structure as of March 1, 2020. Dashed lines indicate 95% CIs.

that during February 19–March 1, the cumulative
incidence of confirmed cases in Iran had doubled 8
times. The estimated epidemic doubling time was
1.20 (95% CI 1.05–1.45) days, and the corresponding R0 estimate was 3.50 (95% CI 1.28–8.14). During
March 6–19, the cumulative incidence of confirmed
cases doubled 1 time; doubling time was 5.46 (95% CI
5.29–5.65) days. The corresponding Re estimate was
1.55 (95% CI 1.06–2.57) (Appendix Table 5, Figures 7,
8). Our results are robust and consistent with Iran’s
COVID-19 R0 estimates of 4.7 (A. Ahmadi et al., unpub. data, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.11
01/2020.03.17.20037671v3) and 4.86 (E. Sahafizadeh,
unpub. data, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10
.1101/2020.03.20.20038422v2) but higher than the R0
of 2.72 estimated by N. Ghaffarzadegan and H. Rahmandad (unpub. data, https://www.medrxiv.org/
content/10.1101/2020.03.22.20040956v1).
Our study has limitations. Our analysis is based on
the number of daily reported cases, whereas it would
be ideal to analyze case counts by dates of symptoms
onset, which were not available. Case counts could
be underreported because of underdiagnosis, given
1916

subclinical or asymptomatic cases or limited testing
capacity to test persons with mild illness. The rapid
increase in case counts might represent a belated realization of epidemic severity and rapid catching up
and testing many persons with suspected cases. If
the reporting ratio remains constant over the study
period, and given the near-exponential growth of the
epidemic’s trajectory, our estimates would remain reliable. Although data are not stratified according to
imported and local cases, we assumed that persons
were infected locally because transmission has probably been ongoing in Iran for some time (8).
Although the COVID-19 epidemic in Iran has
slowed substantially, the situation remains dire.
Tighter social distancing interventions are needed to
bring this epidemic under control.
G.C. received support from NSF grant 1414374 as part of
the joint NSF-NIH-USDA Ecology and Evolution of
Infectious Diseases program. I.C.-H.F. received salary
support from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) (19IPA1908208). This article is not part
of I.C.-H.F’s CDC-sponsored projects.
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During 24 days in Cheonan, South Korea, 112 persons
were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 associated with fitness dance classes at
12 sports facilities. Intense physical exercise in densely
populated sports facilities could increase risk for infection. Vigorous exercise in confined spaces should be
minimized during outbreaks.

B

y April 30, 2020, South Korea had reported
10,765 cases of coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
(1); ≈76.2% of cases were from Daegu and North
Gyeongsang provinces. On February 25, a COVID-19
case was detected in Cheonan, a city ≈200 km from
Daegu. In response, public health and government
officials from Cheonan and South Chungcheong
Province activated the emergency response system.
We began active surveillance and focused on identifying possible COVID-19 cases and contacts. We
interviewed consecutive confirmed cases and found
all had participated in a fitness dance class. We
traced contacts back to a nationwide fitness dance
instructor workshop that was held on February 15
in Cheonan.
Fitness dance classes set to Latin rhythms have
gained popularity in South Korea because of the high
aerobic intensity (2). At the February 15 workshop,
instructors trained intensely for 4 hours. Among 27
instructors who participated in the workshop, 8 had
positive real-time reverse transcription PCR (RTPCR) results for severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2, which causes COVID-19; 6 were from
Cheonan and 1 was from Daegu, which had the most
reported COVID-19 cases in South Korea. All were asymptomatic on the day of the workshop.
By March 9, we identified 112 COVID-19 cases
associated with fitness dance classes in 12 different sports facilities in Cheonan (Figure). All cases were confirmed by RT-PCR; 82 (73.2%) were
symptomatic and 30 (26.8%) were asymptomatic
at the time of laboratory confirmation. Instructors
with very mild symptoms, such as coughs, taught
classes for ≈1 week after attending the workshop
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